When a household chooses a house or an apartment, he or she is choosing much more than a dwelling
Now we shift the attention to neighborhood sorting - the consumers are also choosing neighbors who provide opportunities for social interactions within the community
We will see that in the U.S. cities, there is substantial segregation concerning income and educational attainment, as well as racial segregation
The goal of this lecture is to present empirical regularities within cities related to neighborhoods' socioeconomic composition. To explain the current patterns, we will use some social interaction models (tipping models). In the end, we discuss why integration matters
Consider a city with two neighborhoods: A and B. Each community has 100 households, and each resident occupies one unit of land. Half of the city's population is high-income and half low-income
The Figure shows the difference in land rent between neighborhoods A and B as the share of high-income households changes
At point i, neighborhoods A and B have 50 households from each income level
Equilibrium requires that all households in a particular neighborhood pay the same rent
At this point, high-income households are willing to pay an $8 premium for living in neighborhood A. That is higher than the low-income household's willingness to pay
High-income households in neighborhood B will outbid low-income residents in A. That will move the equilibrium far away from i and up to s
In the end, the two neighborhoods will be entirely segregated by income
Now, consider the case where low-income households have a steeper premium curve - they always outbid wealthy residents
The number of low-income households will increase at the expense of high-income residents
If the composition of the neighborhoods start at any point other than i, low-income residents will outbid high-income residents, and there will be complete integration at the end
m is a stable equilibrium. Suppose there are 75 high-income residents in A. The low-income residents in B would outbid high-income households in A - g>f -, bringing the share of wealthy residents back to 70%.
The same reasoning can be applied to points d and e. When there are only 65 wealthy residents in neighborhood A, high-income households in B will outbid low-income households in A, bringing back the 70/30 equilibrium
Consider the former case of total segregation. A wealthy resident is willing to pay an $8 premium to live with 55 high-income households while a low-income resident is willing to pay only 5. If the wealthy resident consumes more land - let's say two units -, then the high-income premium is 4 dollars per unit of land. That is less than 5 dollars - the premium that low-income households are willing to pay
Now, the low-income households outbid the wealthy residents when the share of high-income households is higher than 50. In this case, in any deviation from 50/50, the low-income families will outbid the wealthy residents, and there will be integration in equilibrium
Some local governments use minimum lot size zoning to regulate land use
One of the consequences of this policy is segregation
Consider the former example again. If the government requires a minimum lot size of two units, the wealthy residents in B will outbid low-income households in A - a $4 premium per unit land versus 2.5 dollars - for any share of high-income households in A greater than 50%
At the end, the two neighborhoods will be completely segregated by income
One of the key features of social interaction models is that preferences depend on other agent's choices. We just saw that households were willing to pay a premium for living in a neighborhood with a higher share of wealthy residents
In the first example, an integrated neighborhood (50 low income/50 high income) was an unstable equilibrium. When the share of wealthy residents was a little bit more than 50%, suddenly the neighborhood turned towards 100% high-income households
Another way to think about this is the following: even if residents have mild preferences for neighbors like them, that could drive the neighborhood to entire segregation. Check the parable of the polygons
This idea can be used to explore neighborhood tipping. Tipping occurs when a new minority group enters a neighborhood, and that causes the earlier residents to begin evacuating
The tipping points rage from 5% to 20% minority share
The figure shows the example of Chicago. The y-axis is the mean percentage changes in the Chicago Census tracts' white population from 1970 to 1980. The x-axis is the minority share (nonwhites and white Hispanics) in 1970
One can see a discontinuity in the plot. There are white population gains when the share of the minority is less than 5% (vertical line). Also, there are substantial outflows when the share of the minority is higher than 5%. That is, 5% minority share is the tipping point in Chicago neighborhoods during 1970-1980
The discontinuity is less well defined for 1990-2000
Self-segregation
Collective Action Racism
White Flight
Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor (1999) differentiate the segregation theories looking at housing costs for blacks and whites. Assume the competitive bidding setting we saw before but replace high-income/low-income by blacks and whites
If increases in white flight cause increases in segregation, whites will pay relatively more for housing than blacks as segregation rises. Alternatively, if increases in segregation are caused by increases in collective action racism or by self-segregation, blacks will pay relatively more for housing than whites in more segregated cities
The authors further differentiate self-segregation from collective action racism by looking at housing prices for different black populations. Self-segregation is more likely for new black migrants compared to long-term black residents. In the case of collective action racism, all blacks would pay a higher premium in more segregated cities
Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor (1999) findings point to
Neighborhood effects
Spatial Mismatch
Devaluation of Financial Assets
The figure reports the average segregation experienced by the typical urban black resident from 1890 to 2010
Between 1910 and 1960, blacks moved to urban areas in vast numbers. They often faced legal obstacles in their choice of neighborhood - collective action racism. As a consequence, segregation rose
As of 2010, the dissimilarity index had declined to its lowest level in a century
Between 2000 and 2010, segregation declined in all the ten largest metro areas
Currently, Chicago's dissimilarity index is around 72. In 1970, that value topped 90 percent
Source: Glaeser and Vigdor (2012)
The successful fight for housing freedom that culminated with the 1968 Fair Housing Act
Significant shifts in public attitudes toward integration
Depopulation of ghettos
African-American suburbanization
Interregional Migration. Blacks moving from North/Midwest to the Sun Belt region
The demolition of segregated high-rise housing projects since 1970
Gentrification and immigration have made a dent in segregation
When a household chooses a house or an apartment, he or she is choosing much more than a dwelling
Now we shift the attention to neighborhood sorting - the consumers are also choosing neighbors who provide opportunities for social interactions within the community
We will see that in the U.S. cities, there is substantial segregation concerning income and educational attainment, as well as racial segregation
The goal of this lecture is to present empirical regularities within cities related to neighborhoods' socioeconomic composition. To explain the current patterns, we will use some social interaction models (tipping models). In the end, we discuss why integration matters
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